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INTRODUCTION

Angelika Krebs

I’m selfish, impatient and a little insecure. I make mistakes, I am out of control and at times hard to handle. But if you can’t handle me at my worst, then you sure as hell don’t deserve me at my best. (Marilyn Monroe)

Emotions are not only “what make us tick,” they also play a vital role in our happiness. This is particularly obvious when we include moods within the category of emotions. In fact, happiness has often been construed as a mood. But are moods—or Stimmungen, as they are called in German and explored in their anthropological significance by Martin Heidegger and Otto Friedrich Bollnow—really a species of emotions? Are they, for instance, emotions that have very general or vague objects, such as our entire lives and the world surrounding us?

This remains an open question. The notion of moods (“attenmements”/“feelings of being”/“existential feelings”) is as yet undetermined, despite its great relevance. This volume therefore has a special section on moods that features the basic chapters of Bollnow’s 1941 classical work Das Wesen der Stimmungen (The Nature of Moods) and a recent article by Matthew Ratcliffe that has led to moods being taken seriously in English-language philosophy. Bollnow’s work has been translated into French, Italian, and Japanese, but not into English. His chapters appear here for the first time in English translation.

The conceptual section on moods is placed at the end of this volume. The volume begins with the more general issue of happiness and the meaning of life. This first section is followed by a second group of articles about the value and pleasure of sharing or sociability in a good life. The philosophical discussion on whether emotions can be truly shared has also only recently got underway. The third section addresses the practical issue of emotional regulation. Then the fourth section, on emotions and the body leads the way, so to speak, to the enquiry into moods which seem more bodily than standard emotions.

Some articles in this volume could just as well have been in one of the other three volumes of this Major Works Collection: The Nature of Emotions (Volume I), Morality, Aesthetics and the Emotions (Volume III), and Specific Emotions (Volume IV). The major reason why these articles are found here and not in one of the other volumes is that they are less general than most of the articles in Volume I and more general than most of the articles in Volumes III and IV.
INTRODUCTION

The good life includes the meaningful life and, with it, beauty, morality, and rationality as well as specific emotions (and moods) such as romantic love, hope, or feeling at home in the world.

Happiness and the meaning of life

"Happiness" is often used broadly, as a synonym for "the good life," and sometimes more narrowly, as a synonym for "the pleasant life." In the latter sense, it is contrasted with "the meaningful life" and the good life encompasses both happiness and meaning. All four articles in this section agree that pleasure or happiness in the narrow sense is not sufficient for a good life. Yet they disagree on what more is exactly needed. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi puts the emphasis on the enjoyment of activities performed for their own sake, Friedrich Kambartel on the calmness resulting from not trying to control the uncontrollable, Hans Julius Schneider on the religious feeling of being part of a greater order, and Harry G. Frankfurt on selfless love.

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (*1934) from the University of Chicago is a Hungarian psychologist who immigrated to the United States at the age of 22. He is one of the founding fathers of positive psychology and specifically famous for his concept of flow. In an interview, he characterizes flow as

being completely involved in an activity for its own sake. The ego falls away. Time flies. Every action, movement, and thought follows inevitably from the previous one, like playing jazz. Your whole being is involved, and you’re using your skills to the utmost. ²

The text reprinted here, “Enjoyment and the quality of life,” is the third chapter of his 1990 book Flow which was written for a general audience; it is immensely readable, abounding with catchy general principles and vivid examples from all roads of life. It opens with a note on Aristotle and the admission that we do not understand what happiness is today any better than Aristotle did. Both for Csikszentmihalyi and Aristotle, intrinsic or autotelic activities, that is, activities performed for their own sake, lie at the heart of happiness.

Csikszentmihalyi also distinguishes between two strategies we can adopt to improve our quality of life. The first is to try to make external conditions match our goals. The second is to change how we experience external conditions so to make them fit our goals. Csikszentmihalyi advocates especially the second strategy of attaining happiness through control of our inner life.

He notes that many people believe that happiness mainly consists of experiencing pleasure: good food, good sex, all the comforts money can buy, traveling to exotic places, or being surrounded by interesting company. Pleasure, as he defines it, is a feeling of contentment that one achieves when expectations set by biological programs or by social conditioning have been met. Although Csikszentmihalyi regards pleasure as an important component of the quality of life, he insists that by itself it does not bring happiness. It also needs enjoyment. Enjoyable events occur when a person goes beyond what she has been programmed to do and achieves something new. After an enjoyable event, we know that we have changed, that our self has grown, and that we have become more complex as a result of it.³

The phenomenology of enjoyment, according to Csikszentmihalyi, comprises eight major elements:

1. The enjoyable experience usually occurs when we confront challenging tasks that require skills but that we have a chance of completing.
2. We must be able to concentrate on what we are doing and get completely absorbed in it.
3. The task undertaken has clear goals.
4. It also provides immediate feedback.
5. We act with a deep but effortless involvement (hence the name “flow”) that removes us from awareness of the worries and frustrations of everyday life.
6. The experience allows people to exercise a sense of control over their actions (because of this, flow-producing activities can become addictive, as illustrated by the chess player in Vladimir Nabokov’s short story “The Luchin defense”).
7. Concern for the self disappears, yet paradoxically the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over.
8. The sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass by in minutes, and minutes can stretch out to seem like hours.

The loss of the sense of a self that is separate from the world around it (7) is sometimes accompanied by a feeling of union with the environment, whether it is a mountain, a boat, a piece of music, or another person. As Csikszentmihalyi explains, there is nothing mysterious or mystical about this. When a person invests all her psychic energy into an interaction and no attention is left for anything else, she in effect becomes part of a greater system of action, which takes its form from the rules of the activity and its energy from the person’s attention. Yet it is only in enjoyable, challenging interaction that the self grows. In systems of action that demand nothing but faith and allegiance, the self is merely lost.⁴

Friedrich Kambartel (*1935), whose Ph.D. was in mathematics, but who became a Professor of Philosophy, first at the University of Konstanz, then at the University of Frankfurt, is one of the leading figures of the Erlangen School of constructivist philosophy of science, best known for its four-volume Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, to which Kambartel contributed almost a hundred entries.⁵ The article “On calmness: dealing rationally with what is beyond our control” is taken from the anthropology section of his last anthology Philosophie der humanen Welt from 1989, which also features a section on morality and reason, and another one on Kant and Wittgenstein. The German text was translated specifically for this edition; the translation was approved by the author.
According to Schneider, the four most important traits of James' concept of religious experience are:

1. The experience relates to an affective attitude toward the whole of life and the surrounding world.
2. This whole includes suffering and evil.
3. The acceptance of suffering and evil comes about in three steps: (a) its starting point is the experience of total defenselessness; (b) after that the impulse to be in complete control of one's life is relinquished; (c) this does not result in catastrophe; on the contrary, it results in the subjectively surprising feeling of being part of an invisible order.
4. This in turn brings about a lasting mental equilibrium.

As against James, who interprets religious experience according to the "over-belief" that there exists a transcendent being that causally affects happenings in our world, Schneider argues that such metaphysical conclusions are unnecessary—provided we have a good philosophy of language like Wittgenstein's language game approach. More specifically, Schneider argues that if religious language is able to articulate an experience that has a deep and decisive significance for the person concerned, this very fact is sufficient to secure its meaning. Any additional reference claim to God or other transcendent persons or powers is superfluous. What appeared to be a reference to a peculiar, transcendent kind of "object" should instead be understood as a peculiar kind of use of our language, a usage that only on the grammatical surface appears to be a kind of reference. Actually, or so Schneider holds, there is here as little "reference to something" as we see in the use of the word "it" in the phrase "It is raining." There is no something to which the "it" of this phrase refers.

Harry G. Frankfurt (*1929) is an American analytical philosopher who taught at Yale and Princeton, among other places. He is renowned for his work on freedom of the will and higher-order volition. But he has also written influential articles on truth (and bullshit!), inequality, and love. The paper "Autonomy, necessity, and love" from 1999 lies at the intersection of his interest in freedom and his interest in love. Some of its key ideas have been further developed in his 2004 book The Reasons of Love.

Frankfurt's paper, which is more academic than the three preceding ones, takes issue with Kant's stark claim that our freedom or autonomy consists solely in following the moral law. To this Frankfurt objects that we are autonomous also when we love someone or something selflessly, be it another person, a country, truth, or justice. We are heteronomous only when we are coerced by others or gripped against our will by emotions and impulses with which we cannot identify. The cognitive authority and necessity of moral reason, and the volitional authority and necessity of selfless love are in contrast to the sheer affective power of emotions and impulses. The authority and necessity for us of the commands of love are grounded in our need for self-respect which in turn is related to our need for psychic unity.

The considerations that Kambartel engages with in his article belong in the context of Kant's famous third formula: What may I hope for? Kambartel argues that the mood or affective attitude of calmness (Gelassenheit in German) consists in not striving to control things that are beyond our control and in living with an unwavering trust that the courses of events beyond our control do not affect the meaning of a rational life. This fundamental but dense article differentiates between three kinds of things beyond our control: first, inalterable conditions of our life, such as its finiteness, the unchangeability of the past, and the openness of the future; second, other people, at least when we regard them as autonomous agents who must not be manipulated or rhetorically persuaded but should be convinced by arguments; and third, ourselves. The article focuses on the second phenomenon, argumentation or, more generally, rational action.

As Kambartel explains, argumentation demonstrates passable paths of understanding without being able to guarantee that an addressee will actually follow or accept them. In relinquishing instrumentally rational control, argumentation only prepares insights and actions that accord with them. It is thus unavoidably based on hope or, as Kant puts it, on rational faith.

The upshot is that only a life that seeks a rational future guaranteed beyond its serious preparation, and in this sense wants to control the uncontrollable, can be disappointed. In contrast, we become calm by orienting ourselves toward what is already achieved when we do it, namely currently possible rational action. The form of present action and not the realization of its ends is what matters in a rational life. As Kambartel notes, it is no coincidence that the successful life is traditionally, as well as in Wittgenstein's ethical reflections, identified as life "in the present." Like for the virtuous person in Aristotle or the person who "has faith in God," "nothing can happen" to whoever lives in the present in this sense; he experiences himself as "absolutely safe.

Hans Julius Schneider (*1944) is also related to the Erlangen school like Kambartel, whose assistant he once was. Schneider taught philosophy, first at Erlangen itself, and then at Potsdam. He works mainly on epistemology and the philosophy of language, as is also evident in his most recent book Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: IMagination and Calculation (2014).

Schneider first delivered his paper "William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein: a philosopical approach to spirituality" at a conference on spirituality and counseling at the University of East Anglia in 2004. He told his non-philosophical audience that he would not have dared to speak to them about this topic if he were without any experience in the field of spirituality. His experience stems from having been a practitioner of Zen meditation for many years.

The aim of Schneider's exceptionally lucid address is to clarify the concept of spirituality and to defend it against charges of irrationality and esotericism. His main inspiration, as the title indicates, comes from William James, as far as the description of spiritual or religious experience is concerned, and from Ludwig Wittgenstein, concerning a rational, non-transcendent interpretation of it.
Emotional sharing

One dimension of the good human life not mentioned so far is sharing—doing and feeling things together. As Aristotle holds, we are by nature social beings and we would not be happy if we had all the goods in life but could not share them with friends. The following three articles address this social need.

Nancy Sherman revisits Aristotle and criticizes modern moral philosophy for its preoccupation with the distinction between self and other. While Sherman deals with sharing and the pleasure it brings in general (her major examples are about sharing actions), Peter Goldie focuses on sharing emotions. He understands emotional sharing as having the same emotion in parallel which in turn serves to enhance and deepen the emotional response of each. Margaret Gilbert goes one step further. In her normative account, emotions are shared when the participants are jointly committed to feel them “as a body” and are ready to act from them.

Nancy Sherman (1951) is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. Her main areas of research are ethics, particularly military ethics, the history of moral philosophy, ancient philosophy, and moral psychology. She is also trained in psychoanalysis, as is obvious in her books on military ethics, such as Stoic Warriors (2005).

In her 1993 article “The virtues of common pursuit,” Sherman argues that we tend to think of the virtues as falling into two classes, self- and other-regarding, and forget how much we care about the things we do together, the aspect of community. The pleasure of mutuality and the expansion of the self that comes with it is a vital part of human flourishing.

One of Sherman’s examples of sharing is an inspired conversation: there is this thrill of being in conversation with another, of seeing the other’s point, of them seeing yours, of hitting on salience together, of acknowledging that the discovery is not mine or yours, but ours, of realizing that even if it originated in one but not the other, the real pleasure is in sharing it, in making it available to the other who acknowledges a comparable pleasure in apprehension, and then, of going somewhere with it, together.

Sherman’s learned and instructive article is a mix of historical and non-historical reflection. Her major inquiry is to discover whether Aristotle and Kant can accommodate the fact of community within their overall accounts of ethics. As it turns out, both can, although Aristotle is more in favor of community than Kant, who famously held that although man is a being meant for society and strongly feels the need to reveal himself to others, he is also an unsociable one and only rarely can find someone with whom he need not fear having his discourses used against him.

Peter Goldie (1946–2011) was a London financier who later became a philosopher of emotions and art at the University of Manchester. His 2000 monograph, The Emotions, is one of the books that helped to bring the subject of emotions into mainstream philosophy. His 1999 journal article, reprinted here,

“How we think of others’ emotions,” corresponds more or less to chapter 7 of his monograph.

The primary objective of Goldie’s article is to differentiate between various modes of understanding, sharing, or reacting to the emotions of others and thus to clarify what lies behind fashionable, but vague concepts such as empathy and simulation. Goldie distinguishes between five major modes of how we think of others’ emotions: (1) understanding, (2) emotional contagion, (3) empathy, (4) in-his-shoes imagining, and (5) sympathy. In these distinctions, Goldie draws heavily on Max Scheler’s work The Nature of Sympathy from the beginning of last century.

The key categories Scheler employs are (1) understanding, (2) emotional contagion (with emotional identification as its extreme), (3) empathy, (4) sympathy, and (5) emotional sharing. The major differences between these two lists are, first, that Goldie further differentiates between two kinds of empathy, namely empathy (3) and in-his-shoes imagining (4), and, second, that Goldie does not have much to say about emotional sharing. This second difference is considerable. Scheler contrasts emotional sharing (Miteinanderfühlen) with feeling the same emotion in parallel (which may in turn enhance and deepen the original emotions of each), while Goldie seems to collapse the two notions into one.

Goldie starts his article with a one-page summary of what he means by “emotion.” An emotion is a complex, structured sort of state in which a person can be, such as Jones being angry or Jane being in love. A person’s emotion comprises elements or episodes that are bound together as part of a narrative structure that makes best sense of this aspect of the person’s life. This narrative structure includes not only the episodes of the emotion, but also reasoned actions that emerge from the emotion and actions that are expressive of it. The emotional episodes themselves typically include beliefs and desires about the object of the emotion; various sorts of bodily changes; and various sorts of feelings, such as being conscious of the bodily changes involved, and “feelings towards,” for example, being disgusted by a slimy green pudding.

This is how Goldie comprehends his five major categories:

1 understanding: piecing together or filling in the narrative of the other’s emotion, e.g., seeing the shame in his blush and finding out what the object of his shame is;
2 emotional contagion: “catching” another’s emotional state in the way in which children can catch each other’s excitement or hysteria;
3 sympathy: recognizing another’s difficulties and having feelings of distress about them, as well as being motivated to alleviate those difficulties in some way.
Goldie claims that understanding is possible without (2) to (5), that contamination typically occurs without (1), (2) to (5), that empathy and in-his-shoes imagining presuppose (1), but not (2) and (5), and that sympathy requires only (1), but not (2) to (4). Perhaps the most controversial of these claims is that both understanding and empathy can go together with indifference or even hostility to another and that therefore only sympathy has an ethical-emotional dimension. As Scheler already put it, even a sadist needs to understand and empathize with the suffering of another so as to fully enjoy tormenting him.

Margaret Gilbert (*1942), Professor of Philosophy, first at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, then at the University of California, Irvine, is the founding mother of the debate on collective intentionality. Her 1989 book On Social Facts develops an account of what it means to act together and form a social group. In her 2014 article “How we feel: understanding everyday collective emotion ascription” she extends her account to feeling together or emotional sharing or, as she calls it, “collective emotion.” Gilbert first identifies a widely accepted “emotion thesis,” according to which having an emotion is (at least in part) being in a particular psychological state. Against this, she puts John Dewey’s contention that sensations and feelings are not essential to emotions; rather, what counts is the readiness to act. With the help of an example Gilbert tries to show that this readiness can be truly shared or joint and not only parallel or “summatative.” The example is one of collective excitement, beginning in the following discussion:

**ALICE** (speaking excitedly to Ben and Chris): “Stella won the prize!”

**BEN** (also in an excited tone): “Wow!”

**CHRIS:** “That’s terrific!”

Imagine that this discussion continues with verbal praise for Stella and non-verbal smiling gladness from all three of them. Then suddenly Alice looks gloomy and angrily bursts out “Why did Stella have to win another prize!” Gilbert’s comment on this potential scenario is that Alice’s remark about Stella is wrong, and Ben or Chris might well rebuke her for it. Thus, an adequate conception of collective emotion must satisfy the “obligation criterion” and account for the fact that the parties to a collective emotion have the standing to rebuke one another for behavior that is not in the spirit of the collective emotion. On Gilbert’s joint commitment conception, persons X, Y, etc., are collectively in E (e.g., excited) if, and only if, they are jointly committed to feel E “as a body.” Collective emotions then are at base nothing more than joint commitments with a particular type of content. As individual emotions are more than that, namely psychological states, Gilbert regards the concept of emotion as ambiguous; it means one thing when it refers to individual emotions and something else when it refers to collective emotions.

Gilbert’s defense of the idea of emotional sharing seems relatively weak. Could there not be stronger defenses that do not see the concept of emotion as ambiguous? One such defense could conceive of collective emotions as organized by a joint narrative. This narrative would comprise elements that are truly joint such as shared readiness to act and shared judgment as well as elements which in themselves cannot be truly joint, such as bodily feeling. Through the joint narrative, however, these latter elements would also be transformed into parts of a truly shared whole.

**Regulating the emotions**

Quality of life depends not only on what actions are performed and what emotions are felt, but also on how upcoming emotions are managed or regulated. This holds just as much for personal life as for public, economic, or political life. The first of the following two articles gives an overview of the main prevailing strategies for emotional regulation. The second problematizes increasing requirements of emotional regulation in the service sector.

The first article is from psychology. James J. Gross (*1964) is, so to speak, “Mr. Emotion Regulation.” He teaches at Stanford University. His co-author Ross A. Thompson (*1954) is a specialist on child development and works at the University of California, Davis. Their article “Emotion regulation: conceptual foundations” is the first chapter of the Handbook of Emotion Regulation, edited by J. J. Gross in 2007.

This informative chapter starts with a familiar example. You stand in a long line at the supermarket check-out. Your annoyance turns into anger when the slow pace of the line is exacerbated by a gossiping clerk. Your blood pressure rises, your fingers grip the cart more tightly and you prepare a scathing remark. But, at the last moment, the thought crosses your mind that a cutting comment will make a bad situation worse. So you keep your mouth shut. This is a typical example of successful emotion regulation. Yet, not all cases of emotion regulation are like that: controlled, conscious, dampening, directed at yourself, and a good thing. Emotion regulation can also be automatic, unconscious, intensifying or maintaining, or a bad thing.

The main point of the chapter though is to distinguish between five different strategies of emotion regulation, the first four of which are antecedent-focused in that they occur before the appraisal gives rise to a full-blown emotional response; only the last one is response-focused:

1. **situation selection**: taking actions that make it more (or less) likely that you will end up in a situation you expect will give rise to desirable (or undesirable) emotions;
2. **situation modification**: altering the external, physical environment so as to change its emotional impact, e.g., by crying;
3. **attention deployment**: directing attention within a given situation in order to influence its emotional significance, e.g., by distraction or concentration;
4. **cognitive change**: modifying how you appraise the situation you are in to alter its emotional import, either by changing how you think about the situation or about your capacity to manage the demands it poses;
The second article in this section is from the University of California, Berkeley, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (1940). "Exploring the managed heart" is the introduction to her 1983 book, The Managed Heart, which has become a classic on the commercialization of human emotions. Two of her other important feminist titles are The Second Shift (1989) and The Time Bind (1997).

Hochschild begins her introductory chapter by comparing two cases that on the surface do not seem to have much in common. The first case, already discussed by Karl Marx, concerns a seven-year-old child laborer working in a wallpaper factory for 16 hours a day without any break, not even to eat. The second case is of a 20-year-old flight attendant trainee who is told that she must never forget to be happy and smile because this is her biggest asset. Hochschild notes the similarity between the two cases: both workers run the risk of becoming estranged or alienated from an aspect of self—either the body or the soul. The flight attendant mainly does what Hochschild calls "emotional labor." This labor requires her to manage, to induce, or suppress emotions in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in the customers, the sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place. With the growth of the service sector, such emotional labor becomes, as Hochschild notes, ever more widespread and not only among women.

Hochschild clearly considers that emotional management is part and parcel of all human emotion and certainly not a bad thing in itself. The party guest summons up the gaiety owed to the host; the mourner summons up a proper sadness for a funeral. Both follow feeling rules that they have internalized and offer their emotion as a contribution to the collective good. What worries Hochschild is the "transmutation" of the emotional system when the emotion is no longer offered in a private gift exchange but sold in public. More specifically, she has qualms about the loss of the signal function of emotion—that is, of our ability to discover our own viewpoint on the world through emotion. Yet, the rising cultural approval of the unmanaged heart, the high regard for spontaneous or natural emotion, the call for the conservation of "inner resources," to save another wilderness from corporate use and keep it "forever wild," may well be, she muses, a response to the economically imposed need to develop the precise opposite—the instrumental stance toward emotion.

Emotions and the body

This section examines what underlies or borders on the emotions. It serves as a link between discussions on the emotions in the narrow sense and the specific category of moods. The three papers gathered here under the heading of "Emotions and the body" could hardly be more diverse.
on theories of justice and on feminist and democratic theory. The book that propelled her onto the international scene in 1990 was *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. The paper included here “Throwing like a girl: a phenomenology of feminine body comportment, motility, and spatiality” was first presented at a meeting of the *Society for Women in Philosophy* in October 1977.12 Young’s observer, engaging, and bold paper explores feminine being-in-the-world on the basis of feminine bodily movement, such as throwing, sitting, standing, walking, running, or hitting “like a girl.” Her account combines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s insights on the *lived body* and Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of the *situation of women* in contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society. Young’s main claim is that the female person who enacts the existence of women in patriarchal society must *live a contradiction:* as a human being, she is a free subject who participates in transcendence, but her situation as a woman denies her that subjectivity and transcendence.

In particular, Young makes out three modalities of *feminine motility*:

1. an ambiguous transcendence: a transcendence that is, at the same time, laden with immanence;
2. an inhibited intentionality: simultaneously reaching out toward a projected end with an “I can” and withholding full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed “I cannot”;
3. a discontinuous unity: locating motion in only a part of the body, leaving the rest of the body relatively immobile.

On this basis, she further differentiates three modalities of *feminine spatiality*:

1. space experienced as enclosed or confining: the physical space available is of greater radius than the space used and inhabited;
2. space lived with a double spatiality: the projection of an enclosed space severs the continuity between a “here” and a “yonder”;
3. feminine existence experiencing itself as positioned in space: the female person is both spatially constituted and a constituting spatial subject.

One major source that Young identifies for women’s different kind of being-in-the-world is that women in sexist societies live with the ever-present possibility that they will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and intention. In defense against such an invasion, women tend to project an existential barrier that encloses them and is discontinuous with the “over there” in order to keep the other at a distance.

Eugene T. Gendlin (1926–2017) was an American philosopher and psychotherapist. From 1964 to 1995 he taught at the University of Chicago. He is best known for his therapeutic writings, such as his 1978 book *Focusing*. The procedure of focusing is also mentioned towards the end of the article reprinted here, “The wider role of bodily sense in thought and language” from 1992. Focusing is viewed as a way for people to get in touch with the bodily or felt sense of their situations and their life as a whole.

In his unconventional article, Gendlin attempts a way of thinking “with, and about,” that which exceeds logical form and distinction. This excess is by no means chaotic nor does it exist in a limbo, he claims; rather, it is an essential highly structured, intricate, and subtle part of thought. The felt sense of something “comes” just as sleep and appetite come or as do tears and orgasms. Emotions also come in this bodily way, but the felt sense differs from emotions in being wider, deeper, and, at least at the outset, more obscure and less clear.13

Gendlin himself notes the affinity of his felt sense with Heidegger’s “moody understanding” and with what some people have called “kinesthetic” or “proproceptive.”14 However, Gendlin distances himself somewhat from Heidegger whom he finds too Kantian and overly metaphysical, interpretative, and relativistic. For Heidegger, as Gendlin reads him, the relationship between practice and philosophy is a one-way street: practice cannot influence or change philosophy; only philosophy is able to affect practice. In contrast, Gendlin seeks to find how practice can inform philosophy.

What Gendlin means by all of this and why he thinks we should trust this felt sense is probably best illuminated by one of the many striking examples he offers: say, for example, you are walking down the street and you meet someone who says “hello.” You say “hello” back. You don’t remember who it is. But your body knows who it is. You have a felt sense, a bodily felt quality, in which that person is implied. At that point you may think “Gee, isn’t that interesting. I know that I don’t like this person, but I don’t know who it is yet.” And when at last it comes to you who it is, you may be surprised. You say “Gee, I didn’t know I didn’t like this person in this strange way.” But while as yet you didn’t, this bodily implying already knew who it is.

The special category of moods

Although it was Martin Heidegger who first discovered the philosophical significance of *Stimmungen* or moods and worked out their fundamental importance for our being-in-the-world,15 Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s book *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* (*The Nature of Stimmungen*) from 1941 is the classical text on moods, at least in German-language philosophy. Bollnow’s book goes beyond Heidegger’s fixation on one mood only, namely Angst or anxiety, and presents a balanced account of the whole variety of sad and happy moods.

Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903–1991) was a German philosopher, pedagogue, and physicist. He taught at the universities of Göttingen, Mainz, and finally Tübingen. His work encompasses 38 books and hundreds of articles. It combines aspects of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein with a hermeneutical approach inspired by Wilhelm Dilthey. Like Heidegger, Bollnow signed the *Loyalty Oath*
of German Professors to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State in 1933. One of his most influential books, *Mensch und Raum (Human Space)* from 1963, has been available in English translation since 2011.

The text included here, "The nature of Stimmungen," is a translation of two chapters from the first part of Bollnow’s book on moods, namely the second chapter on the concept of Stimmung and the third chapter on Stimmungen as the sustaining foundation of the soul. Other chapters in the first part of the book deal with methodology, criticism of Heidegger, the relationship between happiness and community, the sense of reality inherent in moods, and moods as distinct from affective attitudes (*Haltungen*). The book’s second part is dedicated to the particular temporality of happiness and discusses, among others, Marcel Proust and Friedrich Nietzsche.

As Bollnow explains, moods constitute the simplest and most original form in which human life comes to know itself. One best understands them in contrast to emotions in the narrow sense, which are always intentionally directed towards a specific object. Moods do not have any specific object; they are states of being, structuring and coloring human existence as a whole.

Every mood is a harmony (Übereinstimmung) between, first, the inner and outer world; second, the states of the body and the soul; and, third, the individual faculties of the soul, all of which are tuned to a uniform base tone. Because moods still live entirely in this unseparated unity of self and world, it is incorrect, Bollnow argues, to account for moods solely on the subjective side and to assume that they then, as it were, rub off on the world. And this is part of the reason why, we may add, the German term *Stimmung* is untranslatable into English and is retained in the original German in the translation of Bollnow’s chapters in this volume. *Stimmung* refers to both mood and atmosphere, while in English, moods belong on the subjective side and atmosphere refers to the state of the world, such as a landscape in spring or a candlelit room.

Bollnow explicitly does not want to provide a system of moods. He only means to *order their extensive diversity* in a preliminary manner, differentiating between two large groups: the happy or elevated and the sad or subdued. In both groups, he further notes not only differences in degree but also in *profundity*. His list of elevated moods, for example, includes foolishness and exuberance, forced and loud merriness, gaiety and cheerfulness, as well as happiness in all its variants from small happiness, the happiness of comfortable existence, quiet and calm happiness, great and more forceful happiness, to contentment and beatitude.

Yet he also realizes that certain moods do not fit well into this preliminary order, such as boredom, anxiety, and despair on the one hand, and devotion, solemnity, and festiveness on the other hand. Another interesting question he tackles is whether the quiet and equable state on which the *theoretical stance* is based eludes the influence of moods. Bollnow holds that even though this state lies far from the strong exertion in both elevated and subdued moods, it is in itself a very particular kind of mood, a state of dead calm attained through the soft tuning down of individual overwrought forces.

To lend more plausibility to his central claim about moods as the foundation of the soul, Bollnow distinguishes between two types of moods: first, transient, unsteady, or "moody" moods (*Launen*), and second, persistent or basic moods. Mood in English is closer to the first type, while *Stimmung* in German applies equally to both types. Bollnow also differentiates between sentimental and non-sentimental moods. Sentimental moods are, in a peculiar inversion of the natural perspective, pursued for their own sakes. In this self-gratifying form, they remain infantile and can corrupt the healthy life of the soul. Matthew Ratcliffe (*1973*) has been Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Vienna since 2015, after having worked at Durham University for six years. He has written extensively on the topic of emotions, incorporating perspectives of psychology and especially psychiatry. The article printed here, "The feeling of being" from 2005, is a precursor to his 2008 book *Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality*.

At the beginning of his article, Ratcliffe observes that there has been much discussion recently concerning the relationship between emotion and feeling, but notes that this discussion has neglected other kinds of feeling besides these "emotional feelings." He points in particular to the type that includes feelings of homeliness, belonging, separation, unfamiliarity, power, control, being part of something, being at one with nature, and "being there." All of these are, as he argues, "ways of finding ourselves in the world," constituting our sense that there is a world and that we are "in it." He calls them "existential feelings."

In his article, he offers an analysis of what existential feelings consist in, showing that they can be both "bodily feelings" and, at the same time, part of the structure of intentionality. Existential feelings have two characteristics: first, they are not directed at specific objects but are background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured; second, they are all feelings, in the sense that they are bodily states that influence one's awareness. As they constitute the basic structure of "being there," a "hold of things" that functions as a presupposed context for all intellectual and practical activity, he labels them existential feelings.

Ratcliffe is aware that Heidegger's concept of mood closely approximates his category of existential feelings. Yet he claims that existential feelings are more varied than Heidegger's moods, which is precisely what Bollnow had claimed. Ratcliffe appears to be unaware of Bollnow's classical book on the issue. Ratcliffe gives two further reasons for avoiding use of the term "mood," namely, that moods are too superficial and too fleeting. As we have seen, Bollnow has dealt with these two problems before as well.

To make a convincing case for the existence of existential feelings, Ratcliffe discusses work in phenomenology (mainly Heidegger), neuropsychology (primarily Antonio Damasio), and psychopathology. His summary of contemporary studies on schizophrenia, the Capgras delusion, the Cotard delusion, and autism is extremely helpful.

Ratcliffe ends his article with the suggestion that an awareness of existential feelings might also prove beneficial for our understanding of philosophical...
thought.  A case in point is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s diagnosis and cure of problems that arise from the philosopher’s artificial detachment from everyday social experience. Ratcliffe also cites Williams’ understanding of religious conversion as a form of affective reorientation that alters the structure of one’s relationship with reality.

Notes
3 For alternative ways to draw the distinction between pleasure and enjoyment or related distinctions, cf. von Wright 1963 (three types of pleasure: passive pleasure, active pleasure, and the pleasure of satisfaction), Baumeister 2013 and Wolf 2016 (happiness vs. meaning). A particularly stimulating collection, albeit in German, on the meaning of life is Fehige et al. (2000).
4 This links with Goldie on contagion (this volume), and Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1967) on fusion love (Volume IV). What Csikszentmihalyi calls “flow” or “involvement,” with “alienation” as its opposite, Rosa (2016) calls “resonance.”
6 Cf. McGeer 2004 (Volume IV) who also claims that learning to become an agent is learning to hope.
9 The notion of an emotional narrative is worked out in Goldie (2012) as well as in Voss (2004).
12 For further exploration of the same theme, cf. Young 1998 “‘Throwing like a girl: twenty years later’ and her 2005 collection on female body experience, which also features a reprint of her original paper “Throwing like a girl.”
13 For more on thinking and saying in Gendlin’s philosophy, see Levin 1997 which also features an article by Hans Julius Schneider, together with a response by Gendlin.
14 In this context, we might consider also Goldie’s “feelings towards,” Schmitz 2011 (Volume I) “bodily feelings,” and Ratcliffe’s “existential feelings.” For empirical research on “intuitive thinking,” cf., for example, Gigerenzer 2007. See also Salovey and Mayer (1990) on “emotional intelligence.” Gabriel (2015) offers a sound philosophical survey on different ways of knowing, from scientific, analytical, and conceptual ways on the one hand to aesthetic, analogical, and sensual ways on the other.
16 See Krebs 2017 (Volume III) for a critical examination of Bollnow’s view.
17 Cf. Nou 2000 (Volume IV) for the specific mood of boredom.
18 For more on sentimentality cf. Tanner 1977 (Volume III).
19 Cf. Améry 1980 (Volume IV) on feeling at home in the world.
20 See Slaby and Stephan 2008 for an attempt to distinguish between various levels of existential feelings.
21 For a book-long exploration see Kenana and Ferber 2011.
INTRODUCTION


Part 4
HAPPINESS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE