PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION

Critical Concepts in Philosophy

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INTRODUCTION

_Aaron Ben-Ze’ev_

I’d like to meet the person who invented sex and see what he’s working on now.

(Unknown)

Emotions are heterogeneous, dynamic experiences that have been described and classified in various ways. They are subsumed into certain groups according to their shared features. The challenge has been to identify those features. The optimal classification of each emotion will certainly need to refer to more than just one feature in order to pinpoint its specific character.¹

Take, for instance, a prevailing conceptual classification based upon emotional components: cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling. Not all these components seem to have the same significance in classifying the emotions. Thus, _feeling_ is indeed a salient feature of emotions, but while feeling can serve as a factor that distinguishes between negative and positive emotions, such as being pleased or displeased, it cannot account for the finer distinctions within the groups of positive or negative emotions. For instance, distinguishing between remorse or regret or between gratitude and pride requires reference to additional aspects. In the same vein, neither the _motivational_ component nor the _cognitive_ component (taking “cognitive” in the narrow sense of mere information) can be exclusive distinguishing aspects, as the same action or the same information can be part of different emotions. The _evaluative_ component seems to better capture the specific nature of emotions, but in some cases we need to take other components into consideration as well.

The psychologists Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Allan Collins offer an excellent classification along these lines.² Their taxonomy is based on the following central features:

1. the positive-negative division;
2. the self-other distinction;
3. valenced reactions to events, agents, and objects.

Positive and negative: As emotions express a personal attitude, we are not indifferent or neutral when we experience an emotion; typical emotions, therefore, have a positive or negative charge. The terms “positive” and “negative” have to
be used flexibly here. Despite their apparent positive–negative polarity, emotions are more complex than that. For example, love is not simply the opposite of hate.

We must distinguish a descriptive psychological level from a normative (moral or functional) level. Perhaps the terms “positive” and “negative” could be used for the psychological level, and “good” and “bad” for the normative one. From a psychological viewpoint, a positive emotion is one that typically, but not always, involves a positive evaluation of the object, a positive kind of motivation, and an agreeable feeling. From a normative viewpoint, a good emotion is one that enhances the agent’s wellbeing or moral behavior. The two levels sometimes conflict: for instance, pride and schadenfreude (pleasure-in-others’ misfortune) are positive emotions from a psychological viewpoint, but can be bad from a moral one. Thus, pride is one of the deadly sins in Christianity, and Arthur Schopenhauer holds schadenfreude to be diabolical and an infallible sign of a thoroughly bad heart and profound moral worthlessness. Similarly, while pity and compassion are psychologically negative emotions, the latter particularly has a good moral value.

**Self and other:** The second central feature underlying Ortony and colleagues’ classification relates to whether the emotional object is the person experiencing the emotion or another person. We tend to find other people more interesting than anything else, for the things that people do and say are the things that have most impact on us. The self–other relation is significant because it highlights the social nature of emotions; they focus on the manner in which we view others and others view us. Although in emotions directed at ourselves, such as shame and pridefulness, we are both the subject and the object, our concern is typically based on others’ attitudes towards us.

**Valenced reactions:** As people are the typical emotional objects, it is plausible to group emotions in accordance with our various evaluative attitudes towards others or ourselves. Ortony and colleagues suggest three basic kinds of such attitudes (“valenced reactions” in their terms):

- the desirability (pleasure or displeasure) of the situation of the person (other or oneself), manifested in emotions such as envy, pity, schadenfreude, hope, and fear;
- the praiseworthiness (approval or disapproval) of the person’s activities, pertaining to emotions like anger, gratitude, and pride;
- the overall appealingness (like or dislike) of the person, referring to emotions such as love, hate, and shame.

Each group of emotions falls into one or two common basic evaluative attitudes, but other such attitudes can be present as well. For example, the basic attitude involved in envy concerns the desirability of the other’s situation, yet the praiseworthiness of the other’s actions and the appealingness of the other as a person are also important aspects. The three perspectives (desirability, praiseworthiness,
and appealingness) are sometimes interdependent. Thus, desirability often depends on praiseworthiness and appealingness; appealingness sometimes depends on desirability.

In light of the above considerations, here is a classification of specific emotions based on the principles underlying Ortony and colleagues’ work.4

Figure 1 clearly shows the importance of the positive-negative distinction, but also demonstrates that this distinction does not result in diametrically opposite emotions. Anger is not simply the opposite of gratitude, nor is pity merely the opposite of schadenfreude. This is a consequence of the great complexity of each emotion and the presence of other components such as information, motivation, and feeling, which do not necessarily exhibit such polarity. Furthermore, the examples of emotions given in the figure are the most typical emotions in the given group; they are not necessarily the most general ones. The role and plausibility of the self-other distinction is also apparent in the figure. The only examples where this distinction is of less importance are sexual desire and disgust, which express extreme forms of appealingness. Although we can speak about self-disgust and self-sexual desire, these emotions are typically directed towards another person.

The articles in this volume fall into the following major groups:

1. love and related emotions: love (Nozick and Levinas), sexual desire (Ellis), and friendship (Deresiewicz);
2. other positive emotions: hope (McGeer), trust (Jones), gratitude (Card), pride (Taylor), and schadenfreude (Dorschel);
3. negative emotions: fear, disgust, and hatred (Kolnai and Rorty), envy (Elster), jealousy (Farrell), grief (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich), and regret (Baron);
4. moods: feeling at home (Améry) and boredom (Neu).

Specific emotions are also analyzed in the other volumes; for instance, compassion by Peter Goldie (Volume II), enjoyment by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (Volume II), shame by Stanley Cavell (Volume III), and resentment by P. F. Strawson (Volume III). The category of moods is not only discussed but also illustrated with many examples in Volume II.

Love, sexual desire, and friendship

Love is the emotion that is most discussed both in academic writing and among the public at large. We all yearn to feel love, and most of us have loved someone. Nevertheless, for the majority of people love remains a mystery and they feel that they have not achieved it in the way in which they want. It therefore seems appropriate to begin the discussion of specific emotions by examining love and related affective attitudes, such as sexual desire and friendship. The articles here manifest various, and sometimes conflicting, perspectives on love; thus while

Nozick believes that an essential feature of love is reciprocity, Levinas refutes its importance.

Robert Nozick (1938–2002), from Harvard University, is a wide-ranging thinker and one of the most influential political philosophers of our time. His first and most famous book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia from 1974 defends free-market libertarianism. Another of his influential books is The Examined Life from 1989.

In his 1989 article, “Love’s bond,” Nozick emphasizes the romantic connection between the lovers, rather than their individual attitudes. Models of love can be distinguished according to their focus of concern: do they focus on the agent or on the relationship?6 Such a division is not arbitrary, as indeed romantic love is an experience involving a relationship between (at least) two people. These models can be further differentiated into two subgroups: agent-focused models can be subdivided into the other-focused model (such as the care model), and the self-focused model. In relation-focused models, we can distinguish between the fusion model in which the two lovers merge into one, and the dialogue model in which the lovers interact as autonomous agents.

Nozick’s view of love is relation-focused—though it is not entirely clear whether he opts for the dialogical variant or for fusion, as some of his claims suggest. Nozick argues that what is common to all kinds of love is that our own well-being is intimately linked to that of the beloved. In the chronicle of romantic love, which itself is life’s predominant foreground event, other concerns and responsibilities become minor background details. Romantic love is wanting to form a we with a particular person. However, in this we, the two people are not physically bound together like Siamese twins. Rather, they form a new identity. This does not mean that one no longer has any individual identity or that one’s sole identity consists of being part of the we.7 For according to Nozick, while each person in a romantic we desires to possess the other completely, each also needs the other to be an independent and nonsubservient person. Autonomy is crucial in love. As the intention in love is to form a we and to identify it as an extension of oneself, a readiness to “trade up” or to search for someone with “better” characteristics does not fit the attitude of love. Searching for another partner implies destroying the personal self within the long-term established we. This does of course not preclude the possibility of breaking up and finding a new partner; it just indicates that we are speaking about a discontinuous self whose prospects of building a new we are uncertain. Getting involved with a “better” person does not necessarily imply finding in this person a better partner for a better we.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), a Lithuanian-born, Jewish-French philosopher, is renowned for his work in ethics, ontology, and Jewish philosophy and for his criticism of existentialism. Levinas was captured by German troops in 1940 and spent five years in a prisoner-of-war camp. He received his first academic appointment only in 1961, at the University of Poitiers, and subsequently taught at the University of Paris X Nanterre, and the Sorbonne. His two short
chapters in this volume, “The ambiguity of love,” and “Phenomenology of eros,” are part of his major work, Totality and Infinity (French original from 1961). Another of his important books is Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (originally from 1974).

Lévinas argues that an essential aspect of love is acknowledging the other’s essential transcendence. This is tantamount to the question of facing the other person in her alterity. Lévinas regards love as a predestined choice. The myth that Aristophanes recounts in Plato’s Symposium alludes to this. Aristophanes’ myth explains love as the reunification of a single being hitherto split into two and thus interprets love as a return to the self. According to Lévinas, this desire is at once satisfied and disappointed in love, turning it into the most egoist and cruelest of needs. For love remains a relation with the other and the need for love inextricably presupposes the total, transcendent exteriority of the other. As Lévinas suggests, true love aims at the other’s frailty. Frailty does not indicate an inferior degree of any attribute of me or the other, but rather, again, the aspect of alterity. To love is to care for another, to come to the assistance of his frailty.

For Lévinas, the question of love arises from his ethical agenda, at the center of which is the possibility of being responsive and responsible for the alterity of the other. Love and the frailty of the other are two sides of the same dilemma: on the one hand, love aims at the non-reducible singularity of the other person; on the other hand, it often locks the lovers in a space of sameness, a “mirroring” relationship that infringes on the other’s alterity. Lévinas considers love of one’s neighbor to be a paradigm case of love in general, for in loving one’s neighbor one recognizes that the neighbor has a claim-right towards them. There is here an ethical asymmetry that seems to assume that the agent is the only one who has no rights.8

Unlike Martin Buber in the I–Thou encounter, Lévinas does not consider reciprocity to be central in love.9 Lévinas’ position can be considered as an extreme version of the other-focused model of love in which the other constitutes the ultimate preoccupation of a person’s meaningful world.10 What the other is with respect to me seems to be his own business; for me, he is above all the one for whom I am responsible. Reciprocity would jeopardize love’s unconditional charity. According to this view, one should even be prepared to sacrifice one’s life for the beloved. Lévinas further assumes that to love is to exist as if the lover and the loved one were alone in the world.11 Love is based upon the uniqueness of the other, which stems from being chosen and not from the other’s characteristics. Founding love upon being chosen and the other’s uniqueness is the opposite of basing it on the sweetness of the relationship.

Fiona Ellis (*1964) from Heythrop College, University of London, is an academic whose research is at the interface between philosophy and theology. In her book God, Value, and Nature from 2014 she presents an expansive naturalist view that can accommodate the idea of God, and enables naturalism and theism to co-exist, rather than understanding them as logically incompatible.

In her 2013 article “Instable desire,” Ellis examines the issue of unsatisfied desire in light of the positions of C. S. Lewis and Emmanuel Lévinas. According to Lewis, desires, which cannot be satisfied in this world, can be satisfied in another world that is not to be found until after death. The presence of such unsatisfied desires is part and parcel of all human experiences, successful and unsuccessful. Thus, even the best possible marriage fails to satisfy the longings that arise when we fall in love. As Ellis reads him, Lévinas also distinguishes between two kinds of unsatisfied desires. The first are those needs that stem from a lack in the subject and can be fulfilled by consuming and assimilating an object that satisfies the desire. Such needs are capable of satisfaction, and happiness comes from the satisfaction of all such needs. The second is a metaphysical need for an absolute other that resists consumption and possession. Such a desire does not call for instant fulfillment; it is unsatisfied, not because it involves an infinite hunger for something we cannot reach in our finitude, but because it expresses an insufficiency that is without possible satisfaction. In Ellis’ reconstruction of their positions, Lévinas agrees with Lewis that metaphysical desire takes us beyond this world, but believes that it can never be satisfied not only in this world, but in principle. In her own position, Ellis is closer to Lévinas than to Lewis.

For Ellis, human love is not irredeemably selfish, as it contains an agapic (unconditional) component. She argues that erotic love involves a desire for the beloved, and if erotic love is genuine love and not simply the juxtaposition of other-concern and egoism, then both God’s love and our desire for God could have an erotic dimension. Erotic desire could be part of His love and God Himself could be the object of erotic desire. Ellis claims that her exploration of unsatisfied erotic desire has led to a conception of God that differs from the traditional conception of Him in at least two respects. First, God is conceived not primarily as a benevolent creator or a cosmic designer and, correspondingly, His love is not conceived as exclusively or even primarily agapic, as the sort of love appropriate to a creator or designer. Second, God is conceived neither as wholly outside the world and distinct from it nor as wholly contained within it in a pantheistic manner.

It seems that whereas Nozick bases the profound and non-egoistic nature of romantic love on the creation of a we, Ellis bases it on the existence of something absolute, such as God. She considers the skeptic’s question of whether God or such a beloved exists as just as pointless and irrelevant as the question “Is your beloved really the most beautiful woman in the world?” Lovers and religious believers, Ellis concludes, can only preach to outsiders, not argue with them.

William Deresiewicz (*1964) is an American essayist and literary critic. He received his Ph.D. in English at Columbia University and taught at Yale for 10 years until he decided to become a full-time writer. Deresiewicz has published many books, the most influential being A Jane Austen Education: How Six Novels Taught Me about Love, Friendship, and the Things that really Matter (2011).
In his 2009 article “Faux friendship,” Deresiewicz inquires into the current broad notion of friendship, where we can have thousands of “friends.” Against this he argues that once we become friends with everyone, we forget how to be friends with anyone. Previous societies regarded friendship as rare, precious, and hard-won; a “true friend” stood against the self-interested “flatterer” or “false friend.” In light of the disintegration of the modern family, friends might become the family we choose. Yet, the current concept of friendship has changed from a relationship into a feeling—from something people share to something each of us hugs privately to ourselves in the loneliness of our electronic enclaves. In these enclaves, we have stopped thinking of others as individuals; we have turned them into an indiscriminate mass—a kind of audience or faceless public. We are too busy to spare our friends more time than it takes to send a text message. Hence, the more people we know, the lonelier we get. Another disturbing aspect Deresiewicz identifies in our Internet existence is the extent to which people are willing, even eager, to conduct their private lives in public. The value of friendship lies precisely in the uniqueness of the relationship—and social networks such as Facebook lack this exclusivity.

Deresiewicz admits that Facebook has its benefits in connecting people, particularly long-lost friends, but argues that it does so at the cost of reducing identity to information about mundane details. Friendship is built by investing time in joint activities and listening to our friends’ stories, hopes, beliefs, pleasures, and worries. How can you do that when you have 500 friends? Intimate friendship takes patience, devotion, sensitivity, subtlety, and skill. As he puts it, we have given our hearts to machines, and now we are turning into machines.

Does the Internet indeed increase loneliness? In a psychological study (not included here) on the relationship between loneliness and Internet use, Yair Amichai-Hamburger and Barry Schneider demonstrate the complexity of the issue in light of conflicting findings. They claim that the Internet can help many people to build and maintain their social lives. This is the case particularly for older people, people with different physical limitations, and people who belong to groups that suffer from a negative social stigma. The long-term effects of Facebook on friendship and loneliness are as yet unclear, although most of the communication on Facebook appears shallow, as friends are accumulated in much the same way as stamps.

Other positive emotions

This section examines other positive emotions (and affective attitudes) like hope, trust, gratitude, and pride. Although these emotions play a major role in love, they are also in themselves essential for a meaningful life. This does not hold for schadenfreude, which is dealt with in this section as well. Schadenfreude is a positive emotion in the descriptive psychological sense indicated above, but it is not a morally good one.

It should be noted that the authors of the first two articles, on hope and trust, do not consider these to be emotions; while McGeer sees hope as a unifying force of human agency, Jones takes trust to be an affective attitude. It is indeed controversial how to conceptualize hope. Some theories (predominantly, the philosophical and the religious) consider hope to be one of the most fundamental emotions; other theories (mainly, psychologically) do not even include hope in their list of emotions. Without getting into these disputes, it is clear that the experience has something to do with various positive affective experiences such as emotions and moods. The same holds for trust, which is not an emotion, but is associated with many positive emotions and moods.

Victoria McGeer (*1960), from Princeton University, is a Canadian-born philosopher whose main interests are the philosophy of mind and moral psychology. She has published on topics such as trust, forgiveness, responsibility, autism, and moral development, always maintaining close connections with cognitive science and empirical psychology.

In her 2004 article “The art of good hope,” McGeer looks at hope from the perspective of human agency. Her main claim is that we cannot live a human life without hope; therefore skeptical questions about the rationality of hope should be recast as questions about what it means to hope well. McGeer explores the art of hoping well both on the individual and the collective level. A special feature of her text is that she beautifully illustrates her claims with examples from George Eliot’s novel *Middlemarch*.

According to McGeer, hope comes in myriad psychological guises (as attitude, emotion, activity, or disposition), but it is best to see it as a unifying force of human agency. To be a full-blown agent characteristically is to be someone who directs mental energy towards future goods that are hard but not impossible to obtain. To live a life devoid of hope is simply not to live a human life; it means not to function—or tragically, to cease to function altogether—as a human being. Nevertheless, hope has its own risks—for example, it leaves us more vulnerable to disappointment when our goals are not realized. Hoping can also slide into a proclivity for wishful, unrealistic thinking, as well as into practices of self- and other-deception, leading us to exploit the admirable traits of others’ such as their trust and confidence.

McGeer adds that hope arises in situations in which we understand that our own agency is limited with respect to the things that we desire. Hoping is a matter not only of recognizing but also of acting in full awareness of our own current limitations in affecting the world and the development of our own agency. In hoping, we create a kind of imaginative scaffolding that calls for the development of our capacities. Good hope involves empowering ourselves in part through empowering others with the energy of our hope. In this way hope is a deeply social phenomenon.

Hoping well, McGeer maintains, is an art (a kind of achievement) and as such it is partly a gift—of character, background, current circumstances—and partly a skill that we can develop over time. Hope is highly vulnerable to collapse,
leading to despair and resignation. McGee distinguishes between two kinds of bad hope that should be avoided: The first, wishful hope, involves an overdependence on others in supporting our hopes and a consequent underdependence on our own powers of agency; the second, willful hope, implicates the reverse, an overdependence on our own powers of agency and a consequent underdependence on others. Both ways of hoping include insensitivity to the given circumstances. Good hope is responsive hope that is alert to real world constraints.

Karen Jones, from the University of Melbourne, is particularly interested in the philosophy of emotions and rationality; she has written extensively on trust—what it is and when it is justified. Her main research areas are feminism and moral psychology.

In her article, "Trust as an affective attitude" (1996), Jones argues that at the center of trust is an attitude of optimism about the goodwill and competence of another. Optimism about goodwill is not sufficient, for some people have plenty of goodwill but very little competence. Except perhaps with our most trusted intimates, the optimism we have towards others is seldom global. This qualifies not the optimism itself, but only the domains over which it extends.

The competence we expect in trusting another need not be technical; when we trust a friend, the competence we expect them to display is a kind of moral competence. We expect a friend to understand loyalty, kindness, and generosity, and what these call for in various situations. In addition to optimism about goodwill and competence, trust also involves vulnerability in the sense of letting those trusted get dangerously close to the things we care about.

Jones claims that trusting has a cognitive as well as an affective element. She acknowledges that it might seem odd to claim that trust centrally includes an affective attitude, but this analysis is borne out by considering distrust, which is synonymous with wary suspicion. Moreover, trust involves self-confidence and it seems that self-confidence has an affective side. Distrust is pessimism about the goodwill and competence of another, but to be pessimistic about someone’s goodwill is to expect that it is likely that she will harm your interests, and thus to treat her with suspicion. It is because the one trusted is viewed through the affective lens of trust that those who trust are usually cheerfully, and often on the basis of the smallest evidence, willing to take risks depending on the one trusted.

While trust is always a possible attitude to take towards a person, we sometimes rely on people instead of trusting them. Thus, I can rely on someone to behave in a certain kind of way because I have evidence that it is likely that she will behave in that way out of, say, habit, fear, vanity, or stupidity. As Annette Baier notes in her classical article "Trust and antitrust," trust is not a precondition for relying on someone. Relying, but not trusting, is an attitude that we can adopt towards machinery. One can only trust things that have wills, since only things with wills can have goodwill.

Jones says that an adequate account of trust should be able to explain at least the following three fairly obvious facts about trust:

1. Trust and distrust are contraries but not contradistinctary.
2. Trust cannot be willed.
3. Trust can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence.

Regarding (1), the absence of trust is not to be equated with distrust, for one can fail to trust without actively distrust. In between trust and distrust lie various forms of relying on and taking for granted that are not grounded in either optimism or pessimism about the other’s goodwill. Concerning (2), because trust involves an affective attitude, it is not something that one can adopt at will; however, trust can be cultivated. As to (3), while affective attitudes can not be willfully adopted in the face of evidence, once adopted, they serve as a filter for how future evidence will be interpreted.

Gabrielle Taylor (*1927), from St. Anne’s College, Oxford, was born in Berlin and moved to the UK after World War II. Her research focuses on moral psychology, the most influential contributions being Pride, Shame and Guilt (1985) and Deadly Vices (2006). These two books present pioneering work on the moral emotions of pride, humility, shame, guilt, remorse, envy, covetousness, and anger. In our collection, we reprint the chapter on “Pride and humility” from her first book.

Taylor characterizes a proud person as one who values herself highly, and a humble person as one who has a low opinion of herself. These characterizations seem to occupy the opposite ends of a comparative scale. In both cases, people accept their position relative to others and perceive a “fit” between it and their feeling of self-worth; consequently, they do not see any grounds for dissatisfaction.

A considerable part of Taylor’s chapter is dedicated to the analysis of David Hume’s view, which takes pride to be a feeling of pleasure in which the self is both the cause and the object. For Hume, also joy is tied to the self, but in a less profound manner. For example, while a guest might feel joy at participating in a feast, only the host who organized the feast can feel proud of it. Taylor, however, argues that Hume is wrong in assuming that the guest cannot feel proud as well; the most we can say is that his pride would be irrational. Furthermore, Hume is incorrect in relating pride to merely “being pleased by.” Pride involves stronger conditions than that, since we might value something without being pleased by it, or be pleased by something and feel ashamed rather than proud of it. Pride includes some closer connection to oneself, and hence it would be odd to be proud, e.g., of the beautiful fish in the ocean—there should be some relation of belonging, albeit weaker than ownership. Moreover, what a person is proud of in some way exceeds what, in his own view, he expects as a matter of course—he considers what he is proud of as his achievement.

Taylor distinguishes between the proud person and the person who is proud of a particular deed or thing; what is traditionally regarded as vicious is the character trait of pride and not the emotion of pride. Another way to separate the two is to call the more general type of pride pridefulness, and the acute, and usually
more intense, emotion pride. As Figure 1 has it, pridefulness is directed at one's whole personality and pride at one's actions.

Claudia Card (1940–2015), from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, is known for her research on ethics and social philosophy. Throughout her career, she led the way in lesbian philosophy, supporting a variety of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) research and activism. Towards the end of her life, Card developed a secular conception of evil. The two volumes of what was intended as a trilogy, appeared as The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (2002), and Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (2010).

In her 1988 article “Gratitude and obligation,” Card criticizes the prevailing debtor paradigm, of which Kant’s view of moral obligation is a prime example. This paradigm considers gratitude as a response to unpaid debt, which seems natural as it resembles the economic obligations that are part and parcel of our everyday life. Moreover, because the actions of a grateful person exceed what we formally deserve, gratitude seems to imply an unpaid debt. This makes the debtor's position inferior, and singles out the inferior—superior relation as a significant component of gratitude. Card argues that the debtor paradigm works best for relatively formal obligations, but it encounters problems with regard to informal and personal relationships.

Instead of the debtor metaphor, Card suggests the metaphor of the trustee. In the trustee paradigm, gratitude results from having accepted a deposit rather than having taken out a loan. When we receive a deposit we are not in an inferior position; we already have some credit and do not have to prove ourselves. As trustee I am obliged, and I owe it to those whose trust I have accepted to act responsibly on their behalf. But I am not thereby a debtor. Whereas loans are associated with shame, deposits are a source of pride. When I pay back a formal debt, I discharge an obligation. By contrast, living up to informal obligations tends to reaffirm the special relationship involved. As I live up to my obligations to my friends, we become closer friends and our ties deepen. Another difference between formal and informal obligations is that when paying the penalty for defaulting on a formal obligation, I supposedly restore good terms with the lender. In the case of informal obligations, however, the penalty for defaulting on a debt is alienation.

Card concludes by distinguishing two types of debts of gratitude: (1) being happy and obliged, and (2) being happy to be obliged. Only the latter appear to be a promising beginning for friendship.

Andreas Dorschel (*1962), from the University of Music and Performing Arts in Graz, is a Professor of Philosophy whose main research interests include aesthetic theories of subjectivity, philosophy of music, history of ideas, and styles of reasoning. Among his publications, we should mention his book Rethinking Prejudice (2000) in which he examines the struggle against prejudices during various periods.

Dorschel's article, "Polemics and schadenfreude," is an expanded version of his 2015 Philosophy article on polemics. Dorschel begins by discussing the notion of critique, noting that critique, as a project of the intellect, is not considered to be emotional. Rather, it is supposed to concentrate on a controversial subject. Yet emotions do figure in some sorts of intellectual critique and particularly in polemics. These are mainly emotions of aversion: anger, wrath, rage, hatred, detestation, contempt, disgust, and schadenfreude.

Polemics grows from the rational endeavor of critique but, in its sharpest form, it goes beyond it and breaks it. Although a polemicist should be capable of rational argument, polemics can arise from a rightful dissatisfaction with the sobriety and objectivity of rational argument; there are matters that should stir us up rather than be pondered calmly in terms of their pros and cons. Polemics is shaped by personal enmity, though there are many instances when it has been fed by enmity towards institutions or groups. As an example of a polemical text, Dorschel cites Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's attack of a claim drawn from the authoritative journal Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freien Künste:

"Nobody," say the editors of the Library, "will deny that the German stage owes a large part of its first improvements to Professor Gottsched." ... I am this Nobody; I deny it point blank. It were to be wished that Mr. Gottsched had never meddled with the German stage.15

Dorschel argues that drama can be a key to understanding polemics—and the most effective polemics aspire to comedy. Dorschel further holds that what takes place between the two sides in polemics is a far cry from dialog; the target of polemics is not welcome as an interlocutor. A polemical text typically emerges once dialog has broken down; it tends towards monolog.

A typical emotion in polemics is that of schadenfreude. It can be described by the following five features, of which the first two are immediately evident:

1. It is pleasant.
2. It is about the misfortune of another.
3. The other person is perceived to deserve the misfortune.
4. The misfortune is relatively minor.
5. We did not generate the misfortune.

While accepting this proposed description, Dorschel claims that there is in polemic considerable leeway with regards to features (3) and (4): disagreement on who deserves what and on which misfortune should count as major or minor is widespread. But to the extent that a polemicist has managed to create a passionate we, he will have reached consensus particularly on (3). The relation of schadenfreude to polemics is that polemics enables readers to enjoy the slaps dealt to another while minimizing the risk of being regarded as cruel or sadist. Accordingly, Dorschel says, polemics can utterly demolish its target but still be regarded as justified enjoyment for the reader, because (3) the target allegedly
deserved the scourge, (4) the blow was minor (since it is manifested merely in words), and (5) the reader is not responsible for that woe.

**Negative emotions**

After discussing in the previous sections positive emotions, this section turns to the negative emotions of fear, disgust, hatred, envy, jealousy, grief, regret, and remorse. While positive emotions have possibly more significance for our long-term development, negative emotions are more noticeable because of their existential importance.

Aurel Kolnai (1900–1973) was born in Budapest and studied at Vienna University. He was highly influenced by phenomenology and philosophy of language. The Nazi threat forced Kolnai to flee from Austria in 1937, and after seeking refuge in several countries, he finally settled in England in 1955. Despite an impressive list of publications, he was unable to secure a tenured position in academia. He wrote many books on issues in the fields of ethics and of political and social philosophy. His best-known book is probably *On Disgust* (1929).

Kolnai’s article “The standard modes of aversion: fear, disgust and hatred,” published posthumously in 1998, manifests his long-term interest in aversive affective reactions that give some clue about the fragility and imperfections of our moral life and might have a therapeutic value in reorienting ourselves at least the possibility of new positive moods in the place of the old, aversive ones. Kolnai’s “very plain and unexciting thesis” is that of an asymmetry between the fundamental types of negative and positive emotional responses. In particular, he points to the lack of real opposites to disgust, fear, and hatred.

Beginning with fear, Kolnai says that an agent in fear flees the object that she feels threatens her survival or welfare. Flight is the action of putting oneself at a distance from the threatening object. Yet, flight need not literally mean running away or going into hiding; it must only involve some way of averting an impending danger. Fear as such is not intrinsically interested in its object; what interests us about the object is only the threat it embodies, not its nature. Accordingly, Kolnai diagnoses an essential poverty of fear-intentionality. In contrast with fear, disgust is focused on the perceptible nature of things. The intention of disgust penetrates its object rather than merely signaling its presence; it is inseparable from an intrinsic interest in the object. In disgust we perform a sort of flight, too, but it is not a flight from the object’s action but from its perceptual neighborhood and from possible contact with it. Disgust lacks the existential note that is present in fear and hatred. In keeping with its perceptual emphasis, disgust is an eminently aesthetic emotion. The term “disgusting” is a more object-characterizing word than “fearsome” or “hateful.”

Hatred, finally, is out to destroy its object. Unlike fear, whose destructive motive is mainly instrumental, in hatred destruction is for its own sake. Moreover, hatred is never a mere reaction to moral repugnance but has a dual aspect in presupposing (mainly, moral) depreciation and being personally and adversely affected by the presence of the object. Hatred seems more self-imposed, having more of a tinge of free will than do fear or disgust.

Returning to the article’s main claim—the asymmetry between negative and positive emotions—Kolnai offers the following argument: negative emotional responses usually lack the differentiation that is typical of positive emotional responses. Hence, positive emotions better reflect reality. Kolnai’s claim in fact matches the “broaden-and-build theory” in positive psychology according to which experiences of positive emotions broaden people’s momentary thought and action repertoires. Nonetheless, Kolnai’s view might seem to conflict with some robust empirical findings indicating that negative emotions are more noticeable than positive ones. Detecting negative events has greater evolutionary value than failing to notice positive events: in the first case, we might be killed while in the second case we might merely miss an opportunity to improve our situation. However, this “negative bias” actually goes well with Kolnai’s claim that negative emotional responses are less differentiated than positive ones, as the simpler, less differentiated responses to negative events are of greater evolutionary value in preventing immediate misfortunes, while positive, more differentiated reactions are of greater value in promoting long-term flourishing. Therefore, Kolnai’s study of aversive emotional reactions can indeed serve a therapeutic function and promote our flourishing.

Amélie Okensberg Rorty (1932) was born to a Polish Jewish family living in Belgium that later emigrated to the United States. She taught at various universities including Rutgers, Brandeis, and Boston, and can be regarded as a founding mother of the philosophy of emotions, editing the groundbreaking collection *Explaining Emotions* (to which she also contributed three papers) as early as 1980. Her research interests are not restricted to the philosophy of emotions though; they include also the philosophy of mind and the history of philosophy.

In her 1983 article “Fearing death,” Rorty asks whether it is rational to fear death. The permanent cessation of consciousness cannot by definition be experienced by oneself as a loss or harm. Nevertheless, most of us consider death as an evil since it is the privation of life, and life is (generally understood) as a good. However, the absence of a good is not itself an evil or a harm. A harm must be a harm-to-someone; but the dead are by definition extinct, so they cannot be harmed by not existing. It thus seems that it is not rational to fear death. Still, it does not follow that we should try to free ourselves from such a fear, Rorty argues, as it is proper to have irresolvable conflicting attitudes towards one’s own death. In fact, she advocates a kind of meta-attitude of distancing oneself from one’s irrational fears while at the same time recognizing that these fears are natural; that is, they are a functional part of one’s rational nature.

Rorty’s analysis includes the recognition that not all of those who fear death fear the same thing. The hidden content—the details—of a person’s fear of death reveal their deepest conception of themselves and their lives. Rorty mentions several major reasons for fearing our own death:
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1. It is the permanent loss of the goods of life.
2. It endangers those we cherish, leaving them vulnerable or helpless.
3. The world will go on without us being there to experience it.
4. Our lives will be assessed and judged in ways that we can no longer influence.
5. It is an extreme form of the fear of the unknown.

All of these forms of fear of death seem to be directed at the harms associated not only with death but with other conditions as well. These fears, as other fears and other emotions, can have great functional value—especially in situations that require rapid and relatively undiscriminating global reactions—although they are often irrational. It is precisely their precipitous character that makes them so functional; their non-rationality is inextricably interwoven with their functionality. Thus, though it is not desirable to experience fear, it is desirable to be capable of experiencing it, and our tendency to feel it is the most efficient trigger for moving us out of harm’s way.

Jon Elster (*1940) is a Norwegian philosopher and social theorist who taught at the universities of Paris, Oslo, and Chicago before going to Columbia University. His far-reaching work is discussed by political scientists, economists, and philosophers. Elster’s main research interests include the theory of individual and collective choice, the philosophy of the social sciences, theories of distributive justice, and the history of social thought (especially Marx and Tocqueville). Among his many books are Ulysses and the Sirens (1979) and Sour Grapes (1985).

In his article “Envy in social life,” taken from his 1999 book Alchemies of the Mind, Elster holds that envy is unique in that it is the only emotion we do not want to admit to others or to ourselves, partly because of its vicious nature. In addition to Elster’s reason, we can add another—that envy manifests our inferiority and people do not like to admit their inferiority to themselves or others. The combination of the two reasons may explain why sometimes people are willing to acknowledge envy as an egalitarian political motive but are more reluctant to admit to envy as a motive in their personal lives.

Elster distinguishes between weak and strong envy. In weak envy, I prioritize my welfare above the illfare of other people: I might wish the destruction of their assets, but only when it does not hurt myself. In strong envy, there are trade-offs: I would be willing to relinquish some of my welfare for an increase in another’s illfare. A similar related distinction used by psychologists is that between malicious and benign envy. In both types of envy, there is the desire to eradicate one’s inferiority, especially when it is perceived as undeserved. The main difference between them is in their motivational component: in malicious envy one wants to harm the superior other, and in benign envy one wishes to improve oneself by moving upward.

Elster also speaks about “neighborhood envy,” which is the phenomenon that each person within a hierarchy primarily envies the person immediately above herself. In cases of extreme inequality, especially if the superior positions are unattainable for those standing below, far less envy is aroused than in cases of minimal inequality. The latter almost inevitably provokes the envious one to think, “I could easily be in her place.” Hence, surprisingly, lesser inequality can lead to greater envy. Where no closeness exists, comparison is less likely to arise and we are less prone to feel inferior. Those who are close to us, but still above us, make our own inferiority much more palpable than those who are distant from us. Elster, however, notes that under conditions of high mobility, “envy at a distance” is possible because, after all, “it could have been me.” He determines the intensity of envy as probably an inverse U-shaped function of the distance between the other and myself.

Elster distinguishes various behavioral, cognitive, and evaluative mechanisms for preventing envy, or at least for reducing it:

1. choosing one’s friends and acquaintances to avoid those of whom one might be envious;
2. selecting one’s reference group in light of the comparison of one’s situation with that of another;
3. devaluing aspects of the person whom one would otherwise envy, or evaluating the envied object so that it does not appear as worth having.

The two forms of devaluations are illustrated in the fable of The Fox and the Grapes. Thus, one can say “My neighbor earns more than I do, but he has to work longer hours” or “This woman is more beautiful than me, but she will lament the loss of her looks more when she grows older.” In both cases the superior possessions of another are not denied, but the envious person alleviates their sting by framing them as desirable components of an undesirable whole. As Elster notes, Nietzsche and Scheler argued that Christianity resolves the problem of envy by declaring that possessions are never desirable and are in fact an obstacle to salvation. This value change offers a wholesale rather than a retail solution to the problem of envy. Rather than having to debunk each instance of superiority by some ad hoc explanation, the inferior person can now tell herself that she is superior by virtue of (the stance she takes toward) the very properties that formerly constituted her inferiority.

Daniel M. Farrell (*1943), from Ohio State University, works primarily in the areas of political philosophy and the philosophy of law. He has published articles on capital punishment, deterrence, and rational choice. His 1980 article “Jealousy” was an eye-opening study on the nature of jealousy. Reprinted here is a version the author abridged for this volume.

The article consists of analyses of various everyday scenarios of jealousy. Farrell’s two main points are:

1. Jealousy is—necessarily—an emotion that arises only in three-party contexts: A is jealous of C because B seems to be favoring C (in respect R) rather than A.
2. Jealousy is—again, necessarily—something one feels only when one has a desire to be favored by some other person, in some respect, over some third person, and only when one believes that one is not so favored.

The presence of three parties is one feature that distinguishes jealousy from envy: envy typically involves merely two parties. Even if the third party in jealousy is not actually present, at least the belief about her possible existence must be there. Another difference between the two emotions is in the focus of concern. Envy focuses on the desire to have something that I do not have, while jealousy focuses on a threat (real or imaginary) posed by a third party that will cause one to lose the favorable attitude of the significant other. As jealousy presupposes the desire to be favored by some party over some third party, it implies the presence of caring about how the significant other thinks about (or treats) oneself relative to others.

Farrell says that there is an "affective" (or feeling) aspect to jealousy, but that this does not consist of any single, special feeling; rather, this feeling might vary from person to person and even with regard to the same person over time. What remains constant is simply the "focus" or intentionality: to be jealous is to be bothered by the very fact that one is not favored in some way in which one wants to be favored.

In addition, Farrell contends that even if there is some aspect of possessiveness in jealousy, the jealous person does not consider the partner to be a mere object. A man who thought of his wife strictly as an object would not in fact feel jealous when he suspects her of infidelity. He would feel something more like indignation in the way that we feel indignant when someone uses something of ours without our permission. It is precisely because he is thinking of her as a person that he is bothered by the fact that she chose to sleep with another person. Exclusivity, Farrell claims, is different from control. The husband might find himself wanting exclusivity without wanting control; thus, he could be happy if he was accorded exclusivity because his wife freely chose to grant him this, and not because she was forced to do so.

Alexander Mitscherlich (1908–1982) and Margarete Mitscherlich (1917–2012) were German psychoanalysts, teaching at Frankfurt University. Alexander Mitscherlich, who was born in Munich, was involved in activities against the Nazi regime and was jailed in Germany several times in the 1930s. In 1955, he married the Danish-born Margarete Nielsen; for him, it was the third marriage. In 1960, they together founded the Sigmund-Freud-Institute for psychoanalytic research in Frankfurt. In his famous book, *Society without the Father* (1963), Alexander Mitscherlich claims that since the rise of industrial mass society, the authority structures, based upon the image of the paternal father figure, have broken down, resulting in increasingly impersonal relationships between fathers and sons. Margarete Mitscherlich, who was often referred to as the "Grande Dame of German psychoanalysis," took an active part in the feminist movement, for instance, fighting against demeaning depictions of women in the media. In her book, *The Peaceable Sex: On Aggression in Women and Men* (1987), she argues that women are not by nature less aggressive than men—they have simply been taught to be (supposedly) more agreeable.

The Mitscherlichs' first major book together, *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior*, was published in 1967 and became a key text during the student protests that erupted in 1968, leading to demands that the wartime generation face up to the past after two decades of actively evading it. We have selected a few sections from this book for our collection. Needless to say, we bring the chosen sections in their entirety, without censoring political views.

The Mitscherlichs claim that the Germans have preferred to dedicate themselves to the present rather than to "useless brooding over what is past"; they have led themselves into the illusion that guilt can be historically eliminated by denial. In addition, the Germans assumed that the atrocities committed by themselves and their countrymen were necessitated by crimes committed by their adversaries. In such an atmosphere, little attention is paid to the victims. No place was made for sympathy with others, leaving sympathy only for oneself.

Mourning, the Mitscherlichs claim, involves grief at the loss of an individual with whom the mourner was united in a deep emotional relationship. However, sometimes mourning intensifies morbidly and becomes melancholia. In mourning, the individual feels impoverished, but he suffers no diminution of his own sense of worth; the latter experience is part of melancholy. Indeed, in light of perceiving Germany's defeat as a humiliation, German society might have been expected to undergo a melancholic crisis, a collective plunge into depression. In order to prevent sliding into such melancholy, the Germans, as a group, managed to avoid self-devaluation by breaking all affective bridges to the immediate past, thereby disabling mourning.

A major issue analyzed by the Mitscherlichs is the Germans' inability to mourn their beloved leader, Adolf Hitler. They argue that this inability stemmed from the relationship of fusion between the leader and his German people. When Hitler died, the Germans wanted to disconnect themselves from him and the past, as the memory of their infatuation with him was bound to arouse shame.

The talent of a specific charismatic leader is that he lends himself to whichever ideals of his followers have been most painfully wounded. Anyone who does not share the ideals of the masses and their hostility towards their object of aggression is automatically felt to be an enemy.

In mourning, the Mitscherlichs say, the lost object is introjected. But the fantasy that we can still be with him as in the days of his life must eventually be dealt with realistically; internal acceptance of the loss must be struggled for and accomplished. This is why psychoanalysis speaks of the work of mourning. In mourning for a lost person, we also try to emulate the ideals of the person we have lost. Only slowly, new identifications and bestowals of love are possible. But grief is different if the object was loved on a narcissistic, fusionistic basis, where the grief is for oneself and the loss does not imply the ending of a
relationship, but a partial loss of the self, as if by amputation. The Germans’ inability to mourn was preceded by a way of loving that was less intent on sharing in the feelings of the other person than on confirming one’s own self-esteem.

The Mitscherlichs conclude that the Germans must confront their past and work through their history in order to deal with their terrible past and bring about the necessary changes. Mourning can be depressing and risky, but only through it can a meaningful relationship to reality and to the past be maintained.

The next article also addresses guilt, but more so remorse, contrasting it with regret and working out the role of both emotions in morality. The research focus of its author, Marcia Baron (*1955), who taught at Indiana University before she went to the University of St. Andrews, is on moral philosophy, mental psychology, and philosophy of law. Baron has published extensively on Kant’s ethics, for instance the book, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (1995).

In her 1988 article, “Remorse and agent-regret,” Baron defends the view that a moral agent who never felt and never was disposed to feel remorse (or guilt) is deficient because remorse involves a judgment on the agent’s part that she acted wrongly and should have acted differently. This speaks in favor of an ethics of duty and against an ethics of virtue. Baron contends that Bernard Williams’ notion of agent-regret is closer to virtue ethics as it seems to reduce the importance of remorse. While Baron applauds Williams’ notion of agent-regret, she does not think that it diminishes the importance of remorse; we must try to understand when remorse (or guilt) is appropriate and avoid accepting too narrow a notion of responsibility.

Consider the following scenario: While you are driving—and you are sober, alert, within the speed limit, and in your well-maintained automobile—you hit a small child, causing him serious injury. He darted in front of your car; you could not but hit him. What should you feel, besides distress and concern for the child? Guilt and remorse are out of place, since you did nothing wrong. Williams argues that the pain you should feel is not just pain about what happened, but about your having been the agent who made it happen—even if unintentionally and perhaps unforeseeably. The label Williams coined for this is agent-regret.

Following Williams, Baron says that regret in general can be felt towards states-of-affairs or towards one’s own actions; it involves the aspect of “how much better if it had been otherwise.” Agent-regret is regret that one feels qua agent; its object is limited to one’s own past actions or actions in which one regards oneself as a participant. Baron indicates another difference: agent-regret has an ethical dimension that plain regret lacks: it is felt towards the sorts of things that, if done deliberately, would properly occasion guilt.

Baron argues that certain situations call for remorse, not merely agent-regret, and that we would judge someone who felt only agent-regret in such situations to be morally deficient. To illustrate this point, Baron examines an autobiographical account by Bertrand Russell about a promise that he gave to marry a young woman (while he was still married and had a lover), but because of the outbreak of World War I, he could not fulfill his promise, leading the woman to fall victim to a rare disease, which first paralyzed her and then drove her into insanity. Baron suggests that what bothers us in the way Russell tells the story is the absence of any hint of remorse. He does not question his past conduct, asking the sorts of moral questions appropriate in such situation, and he thereby exhibits no readiness to be remorseful. We rightly expect from someone reflecting back on his life a readiness to feel both agent-regret and remorse. If we recognize the importance of agent-regret but not of remorse, we do not fully appreciate the difference between causal responsibility and moral responsibility.

In his paper, “Moral luck: a postscript” (1995), published after Baron’s article, Williams refers to misunderstandings that some of his formulations in the original article may have encouraged. He mentions, among other things, his distinction between ethics and morality. The problem with Kantian morality, as Williams sees it, is that it is fixated on guilt and remorse and has no place for agent-regret. This, in turn, does not mean that a broader ethical outlook such as Aristotle’s (which has a place for agent-regret) does not have a place for guilt and remorse.

Moods

In addition to (or as a particular variant of) emotions, moods are central phenomena in the affective realm. This section examines two specific moods: feeling at home and boredom.

Jean Améry (1912–1978) was born as Hanns Chaim Mayer in Vienna to a Jewish father and a Catholic mother. In the eyes of the Nazis he was considered Jewish, so in 1938 he fled to Belgium, where he joined the resistance. In 1943 he was arrested and tortured by the German Gestapo and then sent to various concentration camps. After the war, having changed his name to Améry (a French-sounding anagram of Mayer), he settled in Belgium and wrote essays, reviews, commentaries, and film critiques for various newspapers, as well as literary texts and philosophical treatises. He published many books; in his last one, titled On Suicide (1976), he defends “voluntary death” as an alternative to depression, from which he suffered intermittently. Two years later, Améry took his own life in a hotel room in Salzburg by overdosing on sleeping pills.

The essay in this volume, “How much home does a person need?,” is taken from his most influential book, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities (1966). The essay examines the mood of not feeling at home, from the perspective of a Holocaust survivor. Améry claims that home is security; it is associated with loyalty, familiarity, and confidence, and with the ability to trust and to entrust. Without home there is no order in the world, while the danger that goes along with having a home is provincialism marked by intellectual witling and delusion. Améry further asserts that survivors like him had to realize not only that they had lost their country, but that they had never been their home to begin with; that they had fallen prey to an existential misunderstanding.
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Améry compares homeland with fatherland, arguing that the two are related, although fatherland typically has a territorial sense, which can but need not be related to a narrow nationalism. Whoever is without a fatherland—that is, without the shelter of an autonomous governmental entity—is also without a homeland. Home ceases to be home as soon as it is not at the same time also fatherland. However, the fatherland loses its fatherland quality if its territory grows too far beyond what can still be experienced as one’s own home. Then it becomes an empire that fills its inhabitants with imperial consciousness and feelings of nationalism in a negative sense.

Améry criticizes modern society, where people trade what yesterday meant home for a second-rate cosmopolitanism, thereby giving up the bird in the hand for the two birds in the bush. Superficial knowledge of the world, gained through tourism and business trips, is no substitute for home. Also the enrichment, opportunities, and broad view of the world that emigration and homelessness offer, are often superficial. Améry does not deny that future generations might be able to get along without a home. However, in such a world, there will be nothing worth cherishing, as all the cities, highways, service stations, all the furniture, the electric household appliances, the plates, and the spoons would be the same everywhere.

Améry concludes that a human being needs a home. Although “how much” home a person needs cannot be quantified, one needs a great deal of it, much more than a people with a homeland whose entire pride lies in their cosmopolitan vacation fun can even dream of. Being without a home is bound to have a negative impact on our wellbeing.

We can compare Améry’s characterization of genuine home with profound love; indeed, profound love is often expressed by saying, “I feel at home with you.” Having a past and a sense of belonging are significant in both cases. Améry claims that remembering is the cue that arouses a feeling of home; similarly, we can argue that a shared history is the mark of profound love. Modern society does indeed offer enrichment, opportunities, and a broader view of belonging in general and in the romantic realm. But still there is something that home and profound love provide that cannot be found in the world of many superficial opportunities. Modern society tends to impede the development of both a sense of home and profound love.

Jerome Neu (1947), from the University of California, Santa Cruz, is the editor of the Cambridge Companion to Freud (1991) and author of Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults (2007). His interest in the emotions is enriched by his studies on Spinoza and psychoanalysis.

“Boring from within: endogenous versus reactive boredom” was originally published in 1998, and then reprinted in Neu’s collection A Tear is an Intellectual Thing (2000). In the article, Neu examines various psychoanalytic views of boredom to reach his own conclusion. He distinguishes between the mood of boredom from within, which tends to color the whole of life, and the more specific emotion involved in reactive boredom, which arises as a response to more particular situations or objects. He notes that the psychoanalytic approach, as well as many people, tend to ignore reactive boredom, assuming that all cases of boredom are from within.

Neu begins with the question of what constitutes boredom. He takes as a starting point Saul Bellow’s characterization of boredom as a kind of pain caused by unused powers. This suggestion is close to psychoanalytic views that emphasize the feeling of emptiness. This feeling, combined with unresolved tension, creates a feeling of unsatisfied hunger. Boredom is usually associated with the absence of fantasies, but one cannot overcome boredom simply by conjuring up fantasies and desires, as these need to be attached to the true character of the subject and the object. We might say that in a similar manner, having many new “friends” on the Internet does not make you less lonely. Boredom and friendship are not a matter of the number of people you are with or the amount of things that you do—they are a function of the meaningfulness of these experiences. This is compatible with the double role imagination plays with regard to boredom. On the one hand, imagination can free us from boring people or circumstances; on the other hand, it can also exacerbate boredom when it brings one to realize the boring nature of one’s life in comparison to imagined alternatives. Neu nicely distinguishes between boredom, which involves desire without an object, and depression, which does not even include desire.

Despite the appropriate emphasis on boredom from within, Neu defends the notion of reactive boredom. Sometimes things are boring; there is a lot of repetition and too little happens over too much time. Nevertheless, monotony and repetition are not sufficient for explaining reactive boredom. Thus, repetitious prayers are meaningful for many and people seem to enjoy having sex over and over again. Whether monotonous repetition produces boredom depends on our interests and on how we manage to use our abilities. While pleasure, or satisfaction, is a form of successful attention, boredom stems from a failure of attention. The distinction between reactive and endogenous boredom reflects whether this failure is caused by a feature of the object or situation, or by some internal problem or attitude of the subject. The failure of attention in boredom should not simply be understood as incapacity (whether attributed to lacking inner resources or an uninviting world, a bad subjective attitude, or objectively enforced inactivity) but rather as touching on the question of what is worthy of and what repays attention, the question of the “right” fantasies.

Neu’s distinction between boring from within and reactive boredom can be compared to McGeer’s distinction between wishful and willful hope on the one hand and responsive hope on the other. In both cases, the experience from within makes improper usage of the agent’s capacities, whereas the responsive experience involves greater sensitivity to external circumstances—hence, the latter is in a sense “better” or more “justified.”
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Notes

1. Griffiths 1997 even argues that emotional experiences are too diverse to make emotion a useful category for scientific investigation.
4. Schopenhauer 1841.
5. See Ortony et al. 1988, 19; however, the figure in the text differs from their figure in some details, see Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 94.
7. Cf. on we-ness or sharing Sherman 1993 and Gilbert 2014 (both in Volume II) as well as Krebs 2015 and Solomon 1989, 194–199.
10. For another proponent of this model, see Frankfurt 1999 (Volume II).
13. For valuable views on the nature of hope, see, e.g., Bovens 1999; Meirav 2009; Martin 2013.
17. Fredrickson 2013; for a discussion about some conceptual issues concerning positive psychology, see, e.g., Kristjánsson 2010.
18. For a review article comparing emotional “bad and good,” see Baumeister et al. 2001.
19. On the distinction between promoting and preventing behavior, see Higgins 1997.
20. See, e.g., Lange and Crusius 2015.
21. See also Ben-Ze’ev 1992.
22. See also Scheler 1972, 74, and the discussion on Sartre in the introduction to Volume I.
23. For an interesting brief discussion on the nature of regret, see Gilovich et al. 1998.
25. For an excellent discussion of the notion of “belonging,” see Baumeister and Leary 1995.

References

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Part 11

LOVE, SEXUAL DESIRE AND FRIENDSHIP